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Abstract While not-at-issue (NAI) content is typically introduced via particular syn-
tactic constructions, accounts of NAI content that only consider the syntax/semantics
interface face empirical difficulties. We develop a new approach to NAI content that
exploits features of discourse structure to solve these difficulties, and we provide
some insight on the strategic uses of NAI constructions.
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1 Introduction
A recurrent theme in discussions of at-issue (AI) and not-at-issue (NAI) content is
that “a single constituent (which we take to be a linguistic clause) can simultane-
ously contribute multiple independent meanings” (Potts 2012). Discourse theories
like Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT; Asher 1993; Asher &
Lascarides 2003) propose a similar idea: a single linguistic clause can introduce
several, distinct discourse units (DUs), each of which may have one or more distinct
discursive roles in the overall structure of the discourse. We show that conventional
implicatures generated by appositives as well as other NAI constructions have a
compelling analysis when we substitute discourse units for multiple independent
meanings in Potts’ quote. Our proposal has three parts. First, we argue that extant
accounts that have NAI and AI content contribute to distinct dimensions of content
or be evaluated relative to distinct update mechanisms are ultimately untenable.
Second, using SDRT, an established theory of discourse structure, we show how
to provide a discourse based account of the phenomena that have motivated the
AI/NAI distinction, and we argue that a simple division of content into NAI/AI
categories based on rejection continuations (No, that’s not true) should be replaced
by a more nuanced view that considers many other types of continuations. The
resulting account appeals to a single dimension of semantic content and a uniform
mechanism for update, but allows that discourse updates can be structured in a way
* We thank ERC research grant 269427 for research support. Thanks to Robert Henderson, Katja
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anonymous SALT reviewers for helpful comments on the account developed in this paper.
that influences the acceptability of future discourse moves. Finally, we show how 
conversational goals and strategies explain why NAI expressions are useful rhetorical 
devices.1 Using a game-based theory of conversational strategies and goals (Asher, 
Paul & Venant 2016; Asher & Paul 2013), we model the strategic contribution of AI 
content and NAI/AI shifts over many conversational turns.
2 Background on appositives and NAI constructions
Wilson (1975) described what was already a known peculiarity about certain types of 
expressions: that the contributions of these expressions do not fall within the scopes 
of modal operators. The types of expressions that fall into this category are rather 
varied; they include mood indicators for questions and commands, interjections 
like oh, gee, too bad, damn, discourse adverbials like allegedly and unfortunately, 
adverbial clauses like Mary assures us, so called pragmatic conditionals like if you 
know what I mean or if you see what I’m getting at, and discourse particles like tte in 
Japanese or re in Sissala for marking hearsay evidence, parenthetical constructions 
and discourse connectors like but, too, hence, so, and therefore. To this list Asher 
(2000) added non-restrictive relative clauses and appositive NPs. The list bears a 
significant similarity to the list of what current semanticists and pragmaticists take 
to be NAI constructions, though presupposition triggers are missing. What Wilson 
called a failure to pass the embedding test, linguists now call projectability.
Wilson concluded from her embedding test that expressions that convey NAI 
content do not convey truth-conditional content. But as Asher points out, her 
conclusion concerning non-truth-conditional meaning ignores the possibility that the 
content of the apparently non-truth-conditional item may fall outside the scope of 
the conditional but nevertheless contribute to the truth conditions of the discourse.
Recent proposals along the syntax-semantics interface have sought to capture the 
semantic contribution of NAI content while explaining its unique properties. These 
accounts echo Wilson’s description in that they separate the semantic contribution of 
AI content from that of NAI content in an effort to capture the “scopelessness” of NAI 
content. Unlike Asher, however, they attempt to model the semantic contribution 
of both AI and NAI content without appealing to discourse structure. It’s easy to 
see why: constructions that have been classified as NAI constructions make very 
effective tools for backgrounding the information they convey, in the sense of making 
it less central to the main themes of a discourse and indicating that a speaker takes 
this content for granted and does not see it as up for discussion or “at-issue”. One 
need only make the assumption that the ability of such a construction to serve as 
a tool for conveying NAI content arises from the nature of the construction itself;
1 In this we sympathize with Amaral, Roberts & Smith (2007) and Roberts (2012) though we develop
the idea differently.
just as the semantic function of a negation marker such as not is to negate things,
the semantic function of so-called NAI constructions is to make things not at-issue.
Thus we might expect these constructions to convey NAI content whenever they are
used, regardless of the surrounding discourse structure.2
To capture the behavior of NAI constructions, Potts (2005) posits that NAI and AI
constructions contribute their contents to separate dimensions of semantic content.
In particular, Potts focuses on the contribution of the expressions that he classifies as
conventional implicatures, including supplemental clauses such as as-parentheticals,
non-restrictive (or appositive) relative clauses, and nominal appositives.3 The multi-
dimensional logic that Potts develops models many important features of CI contents:
it allows them to make a contribution to the semantic content of the sentence in
which they figure while remaining “logically and compositionally independent” of
AI content, which permits them to escape the scope of embedding operators.
Arguably, however, the account separates CI and AI content—and NAI and AI
content more generally—too well: it appears to predict that any semantic interac-
tion between NAI and AI content is impossible, yet as AnderBois, Brasoveanu &
Henderson (2015) show, there is abundant evidence of presuppositional, anaphoric
and elliptical links between NAI and AI contents.4 Interestingly, these dependencies
seem to run in both directions:
(1) John, who nearly killed a woman with his car, visited her in the hospital.
(AnderBois et al. 2015)
In (1), the pronoun his appears in an appositive relative clause and is therefore CI
content (so NAI), but it is linked to John, which is taken to be AI. The link between
her and a woman illustrates that AI content can likewise depend on CI content.
To capture the observed anaphoric interactions between AI and NAI content,
AnderBois et al. develop a mono-dimensional, dynamic account in which CI and
AI content is evaluated relative to two different dynamic update mechanisms, and
presupposed content is treated as a precondition on the Common Ground. In partic-
ular, AnderBois et al. propose that AI content be modelled as a proposal to update a
set of common grounds (CG): a proposal, if accepted, eliminates from each element
of CG those worlds that do not satisfy the AI content (cf. Farkas & Bruce 2010).
On the other hand, CI content eliminates elements from CG, i.e. sets of worlds,
2 Note that providing a model of NAI content along the syntactic-semantic interface does not preclude
invoking a discourse-level explanation for when and why we employ NAI constructions. For example,
in section 4 of their paper, AnderBois et al. (2015) apply their (non-discursive) model of NAI content
to explain certain discourse-level behaviors exhibited by NAI and AI contents.
3 Potts also includes supplemental adverbs and expressives, but we focus here on supplemental clauses,
and non-restrictive relative clauses in particular.
4 See also Amaral et al. (2007).
that do not satisfy the CI content. Since what is up for discussion are only those 
propositions whose status is not fixed in a candidate CG and as the update for CI 
content automatically updates the CG, CI content is not up for discussion, and not at 
issue. To permit anaphoric connections between CI and AI content, AnderBois et 
al. adopt a dynamic update procedure that allows AI and NAI content to be updated 
incrementally. Update of a sentence such as (1) proceeds so that John first contributes 
a proposal to update the CG with a discourse referent identified with John, then the 
appositive content is automatically imposed on the CG in the way described above, 
and then the remainder of the main clause content is treated as a proposal to update 
this recently changed CG. The salient features of this account are that on the one 
hand, update is incremental in order to support anaphoric connections between CI 
and AI content; but on the other hand, appositive content is added to the CG (because 
it is automatically imposed) before the main clause content is added, making the 
appositive immune to the influence of logical operators in AI content.
The two distinct mechanisms involved in the update of (1), however, are in-
terdependent, and so what’s NAI may be more than what is in the CI expression. 
AnderBois et al. say that presuppositional dependence of NAI content on AI content 
forces update of the latter on the CG; about (2), they say that the presupposition trig-
gered by too, which is notoriously difficult to accommodate, requires that the content 
of John kissed Mary be added to the CG before the appositive can be interpreted.
(2) John kissed Mary, who kissed HIM TOO
However, the antecedents of pronouns (including relative pronouns) are also no-
toriously hard to accommodate, so their antecedents, e.g. the discourse referent 
introduced by John in (1), should also be added to the CG prior to the update with ap-
positives that depend on them. Although the update mechanism for John is different 
from the update mechanism for CI content, it’s effect is the same: the contribution 
of John in (1) can no longer be AI if the CI content which depends on it is NAI.5
An empirical problem arises if we tie distinct NAI and AI update mechanisms 
to syntactic constructions like supplemental clauses regardless of their position in 
the text. Sentence-final appositives appear to behave very much like AI contents (as 
AnderBois et al. acknowledge).6
5 Another reason to assume that the contribution of John is not actually AI in (1) is that proper names
are arguably presuppositional and are generally treated as such in dynamic frameworks. In fact, in all
of the examples that AnderBois et al. provide with sentence-medial appositives—that is, sentences of
the form AI + NAI + AI—the first AI contribution (e.g. John) involves an arguably presuppositional
expression.
6 See Syrett & Koev 2015 for experimental evidence of the difference between sentence-medial and
sentence-final appositives with regard to discourse continuations.
(3) In springtime, the fish swim upriver and give birth to live young, who then
spend their first months living on land. (variant on AnderBois et al.’s (92)).
(4) While she was filming Fresh Prince, her mother, who then worked as a
librarian, would call her with Black history stories. (variant on AnderBois
et al.’s (93))
AnderBois et al., like Potts (2005), assume that supplemental clauses always con-
tribute CI content. Yet in (3), the content of the appositive appears to be very much
up for discussion. For example, an utterance of “No, that’s not true!" would easily
be taken to target the content of the appositive. By contrast, it is highly unlikely that
such a response to (4) would be interpreted as targeting the appositive. Sentence-final
appositives seem to stay open for discussion in a way that medial appositives do not.
In an effort to explain away the threat that (3) and (4) pose to their account, An-
derBois et al. suggest that then moves the reference time forward in final appositives,
while it retains the reference time of the main clause in medial appositives. They use
this distinction, with observations about continuations like “No, that’s not true!”, to
motivate an ambiguous treatment of medial and final appositives. Yet an appositive’s
syntactic position does not determine the interpretation of adverbials like then. The
appositive in (4) can have the same interpretation when sentence final:
(4’) While she was filming Fresh Prince, she would receive a new book each
week from her mother, who then worked as a librarian.
It seems rather that the placement of the appositive affects its NAI status, counter to
the assumption that appositives always contribute NAI content.
A final and fatal difficulty with the idea that the AI/NAI distinction rests on a
distinction between proposals to update and automatic impositions or constraints
on the CG is that it gives rise to an absurd consequence: just by using a particular
syntactic structure, a speaker can force her interlocutor to commit to a particular
content. Not only is this highly unintuitive, but it’s demonstrably untrue for examples
like (5), taken from the Princess Bride:
(5) Buttercup: (a) He [Humperdink]... can find a falcon on a cloudy day, he can
find you!
Wesley: (b) You think your dearest love will save you?
Buttercup: (c) I never said he was my dearest love, and yes, he will save
me. That I know.
Wesley: (d) You admit to me that you do not love your fiancé?
Buttercup: (e) He knows I do not love him.
As background, Buttercup became engaged to Prince Humperdink, whom she does 
not love, after she came to believe that her true love, Wesley, had been killed by
pirates. In this scene, she has been taken hostage by a pirate. She believes him to be 
the pirate who killed Wesley, but unbeknownst to her, he is Wesley in disguise.
In (5a), Buttercup is trying to convince Wesley to release her by telling him that 
she will be saved whatever he does. Wesley follows up in (5b) with a seemingly 
on-topic confirmation q uestion c oncerning B uttercup’s g oal. H owever, u sing a 
presuppositional construction,7 which gives rise to NAI content, he sneaks in a 
question of his own: whether Buttercup loves Humperdink. He follows up on this 
question in (5d) and continues to return to the topic in later scenes. In fact, we come 
to realize that Wesley disguised himself in the first place precisely because he wanted 
to get an honest answer to this question. If we assume that Buttercup is automatically 
committed to the content of the presupposition, however, we lose sight of the fact 
that Wesley is looking to see whether she accepts this content or not and the fact that 
her letting the content pass without correction would be incriminating—that is, she 
would be the one held accountable for her commitment to this content, not him.
One might respond that we can re-describe this situation in a way that is compat-
ible with AnderBois et al.’s account: Wesley uses a presupposition to automatically 
update Buttercup’s commitments (through automatic accommodation in the CG) 
and then tests her to see whether she will revise this update or not. We see multiple 
problems with this description. First, it is unintuitive: Buttercup rejects the content, 
and there is no reason to think that she was committed to it prior to her objection. 
Second, AnderBois et al. do not provide an account of correction of CG content. 
Third, we do not see how they could develop such an account without collapsing 
the two update mechanisms. The CG has been automatically updated with the pre-
supposition that Humperdink is Buttercup’s true love, so there are no worlds left in 
the CG in which this content is not true. To make sense of the correction, worlds in 
which Buttercup does not love Humperdink will have to be (somehow) reintroduced, 
and the proposal that she loves him will have to be put on the table. That is, the 
presupposed content will have to be treated as AI content. In our account, which we 
develop in the next section, utterance content does not disappear into the CG when 
the discourse moves on. Representational discourse structures track and store the 
content of each discourse unit, allowing the content of past utterances to be targeted 
by correction, which we model as a discourse relation.
7 We could rework this example using an appositive, e.g.: W: You think that Humperdink, whom you
love so dearly, will save you? B: I never said that I loved him, and yes, he will save me.... Using
the original presupposition, however, is powerful because if it is ever reasonable to assume that an
interlocutor can employ an NAI construction to force his interlocutor to commit to its content, it
seems that presuppositional constructions would make the best candidates.
3 A discourse account
The undesirable consequences of Potts 2005 and AnderBois et al. 2015 stem from the
assumption that the NAI status of content conveyed by what have been classified as
NAI devices is a direct consequence of their syntactic and semantic features. In this
section, we show that the NAI status of certain constructions follows from general
principles of discourse structure. The account that we develop allows semantic
interactions between AI and NAI content and accounts for the data on sentence-final
appositives, and it does so without requiring automatic impositions of content on the
CG. In fact, our account makes no assumptions about the CG whatsoever. The CG is
irrelevant to our account.
We start with the idea that a speaker cannot force an interlocutor to commit to
content, but that it is within the power of a speaker to construct her discourse in such
a way as to make certain content more or less accessible for discourse continuations.
Compare (6) and (7).
(6) A guy at work, who has a sister in fashion design, gave me this shirt.
a. ? She works for Stella McCartney.
b. I like it a lot.
(7) I got this shirt from a guy at work, who has a sister in fashion design.
a. She works for Stella McCartney.
b. I like it a lot.
While judgments on discourse continuations and the role of the appositives in (6)
and (7) are subtle, it seems clear that one cannot build off of the appositive in (6) in
a way that completely ignores the content of the main clause by ignoring the guy at
work and the shirt that he gave the speaker.8 To the extent that (6a) is an acceptable
continuation of (6), we need to understand a relation between Stella McCartney and
the shirt that was given—a relation not provided by the example as it stands.
In the rest of this section, we lay out an account of NAI and AI content that is
driven mainly by data on discourse continuations that are not limited to corrections
or rejections of content. In our account, the idea of a binary distinction of types of
content dissolves in favor of a more complex and dynamic picture of information
that is accessible to continuations of different types to different degrees.
8 The interpretation of appositives is also sensitive to the preceding discourse, when the sentences
in which they figure are not discourse i nitial. As many, including AnderBois et al. (2015), have 
observed, it is very difficult, if not impossible to construct an example in which the appositive is 
relevant to the preceding discourse while the main clause is irrelevant to it.
3.1 Discourse structure
Discourse theories start from the undeniable intuition that discourses have an organi-
zation beyond the level of a sentence and that each clause, or relevant unit of content, 
plays certain semantically and pragmatically important roles relative to other units of 
content, so as to form a relational structure that represents the content of the whole 
discourse. Linguistic theories of discourse structure like SDRT characterize these 
discourse structures and their semantic and pragmatic effects.
Characterizing a discourse structure involves solving three problems. First, how 
do we individuate the elementary discourse units (EDUs) of discourse content that 
play semantically and pragmatically important roles? Second, what types of relations 
hold between EDUs? Third, what are the constraints, if any, on how a discourse can 
be structured? All three tasks are relevant to the concerns of this paper. Starting 
with the first, i f i n a  g iven s entence, s ome c ontent p rojects o ut f rom operators 
(i.e., it fails the embedding test), then the expressions determining that content 
should form at least one EDU. Another sufficient (and non-necessary) condition for 
EDU segmentation in SDRT is that every clause contribute at least one EDU to the 
discourse. As for the second problem, we assume with SDRT that discourse units 
are related by various rhetorical relations, including Question Answer Pair (QAP), 
in which one discourse unit answers a prior unit characterized by a question, and 
Explanation, in which one discourse unit provides an explanation for the eventuality 
described by another. We address the third task below.
Our vocabulary for describing discourse structures contains a countable set 
of discourse unit labels DU = {pi,pi1,pi2, . . .} and a finite set of discourse relation 
symbols Rel = {R,R1, . . .Rn}, which we add to the vocabulary of a language L for 
describing EDU contents (e.g., the language of dynamic predicate logic). Formulas 
in the SDRT language are of the form pi : ϕ , where ϕ , which describes the content 
of pi , is: a formula of L; a formula of the form R(pi1,pi2), which says that pi2 stands 
in coherence relation R to pi1; or a conjunction of SDRT formulas. Following Asher 
& Lascarides (2003), each discourse relation comes with constraints as to when 
it can be coherently used in context and when it cannot.9 We note that in SDRT 
several discourse units can be grouped together as a complex discourse unit (CDU) 
that can be characterized via an SDRT formula. A CDU is formed when a group of 
DUs (EDUs or CDUs) work together to form an argument to a rhetorical relation.
A discourse structure for a text can be represented as a graph (V,E1,E2,Last, `), 
where V ⊆ DU is a set of vertices each representing a discourse unit; E1 ⊆ V 2 a
9 While discourse structure inferences are typically nonmonotonic or probabilistic, implemented SDRT
models (Muller, Afantenos, Denis & Asher 2012; Afantenos, Kow, Asher & Perret 2015; Perret, 
Afantenos, Asher & Morey 2016) have proven predictive over large corpora of discourse annotated, 
extended texts.
set of directed edges representing links between discourse units that are labelled by
` : E1 → Rel with discourse relations; E2 ⊆ V 2 describes the membership relation 
between the set of DUs figuring in CDUs and the CDUs in which they figure; and Last 
∈ V is the last EDU in the linear, textual ordering of EDUs in d. An SDRS is spanning 
in that all elements of V other than the root have at least (and possibly more than) 
one incoming edge: ∀pix∈V.(pix 6=ROOT → ∃piv∈ V.((piv,pix) ∈ E1)).
We return now to the task of determining constraints on discourse structures. 
The most relevant for our current purposes is the Right Frontier Constraint (RFC), 
which determines how discourse units can attach to a contextually given discourse 
structure. The RFC requires that given a discourse graph G, a new EDU to be 
attached to G must be attached to a node along the Right Frontier (RF) of G. Nodes 
that are not on the RF can be accessed, but only through what Asher (1993) calls 
discourse subordination. This occurs when a speaker explicitly brings content back 
into salience, e.g. by saying, Going back to your first point about the economy... 
after the conversation has moved on to another point. To define the RF of a graph G, 
SDRT distinguishes two types of edges in the set E1, coordinating and subordinating. 
Relations such as Explanation, Elaboration, and Background—in which the second 
argument seems to add information about the first, rather than push the discourse 
forward—are represented with subordinating (vertical) edges. Relations such as 
Continuation, Narration, and Result—in which the second argument shuts off the 
accessibility of the first—are represented with coordinating (horizontal) edges.
Let e(pix,piy) mean that edge e has initial point pix and endpoint piy. A node pix is 
on the RF of a graph G, i.e. RFG(pix), just in case pix is Last, pix is related to Last via 
a series of subordinating (Sub) edges, or pix is a CDU that includes a node in RFG:
Definition 1  L et G  =  (V,E1,E2,Last, `) b e a  d iscourse g raph. ∀ pix,piy,piz ∈ V , 
RFG(pix) iff (i) pix=Last, (ii) RFG(piy) & ∃e ∈ E1, e(pix,piy) & Sub(e), or (iii) RFG(piy) 
& ∃e ∈ E2, e(pix,piy).
Note that the RF is updated dynamically each time a new EDU is processed; the RF 
for (attachment of) an EDU pin will be determined by the graph Gpi0−pin−1 . The RF for 
a CDU pim . . .pin, m < n, is the RF for pim.
3.2 Appositives revisited
The discourse structures characterized above allow us to explain many important 
features of appositives. First, an appositive will contribute an EDU distinct from that 
contributed by its main clause, which means that it need not remain in the scope of an 
operator that has scope over the main clause; whether it does or not depends on the 
attachment heuristics for appositives. Second, we distinguish appositives (without 
presupposition triggers) from presuppositions via the relations that attach these
constituents to the discourse context: presuppositions can be bound via a particular 
discourse relation (Consequence), whereas CIs, like all discourse-new content, must 
attach via discourse relations other than Consequence (Asher & Lascarides 1998). 
And SDRT’s dynamic semantics models anaphoric connections between CI and AI 
content: when certain structural constraints, including the RFC, are met, anaphoric 
links can hold between expressions figuring in mutually accessible DUs (Asher & 
Lascarides 2003).
SDRT predicts the observation from AnderBois et al. 2015 that sentence-final 
appositives license continuations more easily than medial appositives do. Sentence-
final appositives will be on the RF, because the appositive will be Last, and will 
therefore remain accessible for discourse continuations. By contrast, when the 
appositive is medial, the main clause will be Last because it will be the last complete 
DU added to the discourse, and the appositive will be inaccessible because of the 
way it attaches to the main clause.
In more detail, let us revisit examples (3) and (4).
(3) [In springtime,]pi1 [the fish swim upriver and give birth to live young]pi2 , [who
then spend their first months living on land.]pi3
(4) [While she was filming Fresh Prince,]pi4 [her mother, [who then worked as a
librarian,]pi5 would call her with Black history stories.]pi6
First, we note that in (3), the appositive is Last: [main clause ]pin−1 [appos]pin , while
in (4) the main clause is Last: [main [appos]pin−1 clause]pin . Next, the units in (3)
and (4) are related with different rhetorical relations (cf. Asher & Lascarides 2003).
(3) pi1
pi2 pi3
Frame
Narration pi6
pi4
pi5
(4)
Frame
Background
In (3), attachment of pi3 to pi2 renders pi2 (the main clause) inaccessible, but puts
pi3 on the RF. We therefore predict that building off of the appositive in (3) should
be easy, while building off of the main clause in a way that ignores the appositive,
is difficult. This prediction is illustrated in the contrast between the following
continuations to (3):
(8) ... ? They die shortly thereafter.
(9) ... Using their fins as “feet”, they are able to move through the grass to find
insects to eat.
In (4), pi6 is Last and pi4 is super-ordinate to it, meaning that both pi6 and pi4 are
on the RF. pi5, however, is subordinate rather than super-ordinate to Last/pi6 and is
therefore off of the RF and inaccessible (cf. the infelicity of (6a)).10
The principles of SDRT dictate that a medial appositive cannot serve as the
second argument to a coordinating relation that attaches to Last (Asher 2000; Asher
& Lascarides 1998). To see this, consider AnderBois et al.’s (2015) infelicitous (10).
(10) ?? John kissed Mary, who then kissed him, at the concert in the park.
Let pi1 be the appositive and let pi2 be the main clause. Our account predicts that pi2
is Last and therefore on the RF. If we attempt to construct a discourse structure for
(10), however, we get the formula Narration(pi2,pi1). Since Narration is coordinating,
this entails that pi2 is not on the RF, contrary to what its status as Last entails. This
structure is unacceptable, and so (10) is predicted to be infelicitous. By contrast, a
medial appositive is free to serve as the second argument to a subordinating relation,
because this does not threaten the accessibility of the main clause.
An SDRT-based account makes further predictions that appear to be borne out.
First, it predicts that the main clause in (4) and (4’) (in which the appositive is
sentence-final) will be on the RF and thus accessible regardless of the position of the
appositive (cf. (6b) and (7b)).
(11) While she was filming Fresh Prince, her mother, who then worked as a
librarian, would call her with Black history stories. Many of them moved her
to tears/She spent hours on the phone.
(12) While she was filming Fresh Prince, she would receive a new book each
week from her mother, who then worked as a librarian. Many of them moved
her to tears/She spent hours reading them.
Second, our account predicts that discourse continuations can pick up on the
content of a medial appositive so long as the appositive figures in a CDU that is on
the RF. Consider the following examples:
(13) a. Marie, the best volleyball player in the district, is joining our team.
We’re going to be invincible!
b. Marie, the worst volleyball player in the district, is joining our team.
? We’re going to be invincible!
The continuation (We’re going to be invincible!) is sensitive to the content of the
appositive—(13b) can only have an ironic reading. In this case, the appositive and
main clause function together to justify the continuation.
Interestingly, our account leaves the door open for discourses like (14).
10 See Jasinskaja 2016 for a similar but independently developed proposal.
(14) [The candidate must submit her manuscript by Dec. 1 to the committee,]pi1
[who must then approve it within 5 days,]pi2 [in order for the candidate to
graduate on time.] pi3 .
In (14), pi1 is relevant to the discourse continuation pi3 despite its being related to
pi2 via Narration. This is possible for two reasons. First, even though we may have
a single syntactic constituent at the level of IP, we have three separate discourse
constituents with the medial appositive as the second constituent. This gets around
the problem posed by (10). Second, much like the appositive and main clause in
(13a), pi1 and pi2 in (14) work together as a CDU to support the continuation with pi3.
3.3 A fresh look at not-at-issue content
The account that we have developed above differs from alternative accounts in
various ways. While we agree that NAI constructions are good tools for forcing their
content to play a secondary role in the discourse, we reject the claim from models
along the syntax-semantics interface that the syntactic and semantic features of these
constructions are solely responsible for their ability to do so. In our account, syntactic
and semantic features are crucial for determining the discourse contribution of a
given sentence—they help to determine, for example, what EDUs are contributed to a
discourse and also how these EDUs are attached to one another. However, whether or
not the configuration of discourse units contributed by a sentence containing an NAI-
device allows the NAI content to interact with discourse units prior or subsequent to
the main clause follows from general principles of discourse structure.
In emphasizing the role of discourse in the interpretation of NAI constructions,
our account echoes sentiments in Amaral et al. 2007 and Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver
& Roberts 2010. The model that we offer is, however, importantly different. Not
only is it not a QUD-based model, but we do not assume that the discursive roles of
discourse segments reflect in any overt way the conversational goals of interlocutors.
We discuss the relation between goals and discourse structure in Section 4.
Another important way in which our account differs from the other accounts
that we have considered concerns the role of commitments in our model. We, like
AnderBois et al. (2015), find the proposal-based account of assertions from Farkas
& Bruce 2010 very insightful. At the same time, we think that one should be careful
in extending this model to the contents of sentences that convey multiple kinds of
meaning. The motivation to model NAI content as imposing, à la AnderBois et al.
2015,11 an automatic update of the CG seems to be the following. The felicity of no
(or yes) as a response to an assertion motivates treating the content of that assertion
as a proposal; when uttered as a response to a sentence containing an appositive, no
11 See also Murray 2011 for a closely related approach to evidentials.
does not target the appositive (leaving sentence-final appositives aside); therefore,
appositives should not be analyzed as proposals to update the CG. This reasoning
discounts the possibility that a speaker might put forward a multi-part proposal,
which would require her interlocutor to adopt different strategies for rejecting the
different parts.
In fact, while no/yes continuations provide a strong motivation for treating
simple assertions as proposals, these interactions do not yield a model of correction
of individual discourse units. Take, for example, (15):
(15) A: John made the cake.
B: No, it was Mary.
A simple no would have a different reading from B’s response. A rejection can
target even the content of a single segment in different ways. In SDRT, rejections or
corrections with no involve a structural relation. Structural relations, including Cor-
rection and also Contrast, sometimes focus on just a particular part of a constituent,
whether simple or complex, that they take as an argument. As detailed in Asher &
Lascarides 2003, B’s correcting move in (15), if it just stops with no is rather odd;
we know that B objects to what A said but not exactly what she finds objectionable.
The continuation it was Mary makes precise what B objects to: it wasn’t that there
wasn’t a cake made, it was just that it was Mary who made it.
When we scale up to larger discourses, we again need to clearly circumscribe
the target of a rejection, either by explicitly stating it, as in (18), or by relying on
features of the discourse itself, as in (16).12 Consider the following examples, found
through Google:
(16) “You did not know that because your identity was transmitted TBF-To Be
Forgotten-in order to mask you living in the world with humans. You were
never to know the truth...You had the chance to be normal like them, Sarabel.
But you’ve lost it now,” she said, “I’m sorry”. A fury of emotion pillaged
12 In this paper, we will not explore the features that guide how a rejection will be understood. We
observe nevertheless that features of the larger discourse can play a role. In (16), the vast majority 
of the content being rejected (much of which is left out in the excerpt above) is dedicated to telling 
Sarabel that she is an alien; I’m sorry is merely a comment on this larger topic. In (17), the 
interpretation depends on whether we understand all of Abby’s comment as forming a CDU. We also 
note that the kind of discourse relation might make a difference. Suppose I say, John is going to 
be late because his bike is broken and someone corrects me with no, that’s not true. If we take the 
correction as targeting the content his bike is broken, then where does that leave my claim that John 
is going to be late? It’s hard to reject one part of an Explanation without calling its other part into 
question. Finally, there are rules about dialogue that are relevant to the interpretation of correction 
but which go beyond discourse structure as we have presented it here. For instance, the interpretation 
of a correction will depend in part on when interlocutors are allowed to reject.
through Sarabel then. Tears fluttered through her eyelashes. “No! That’s
not true! It’s just not true! What about my parents?” Sarabel asked. “They
are one with us as well. But you mustn’t tell them that. Let them live the life
you can no longer have,” she said. “No!” Sarabel shouted, “It isn’t true!”.
(17) Abby: “Dad said you cheated on him, that you wanted a divorce, you met
another man.” Jill “No, that’s not true".
(18) R.S.: “No, they’re not pushable. They are sellouts. They are co-opted.
They—”
T.O.: “That’s not true. She’s clearly pushable.”
Examples (16)-(18) bring out another important point, namely that corrections
like No, that’s not true need not target the most recent utterance in a discourse.
Koev (2012) emphasizes, as we have, the influence of the sentential position of an
appositive in its interpretation. However, Koev arrives at the conclusion that recency
is the most important feature in determining whether something is “at-issue” or not,
and thus whether it will be targeted with a correction such as No, that isn’t true.
(16)-(18) refute this claim; in (17), for example, the rejection can target the CDU
formed from Abby’s entire comment. In fact, many of the examples discussed in our
presentation of our discourse approach undermine this claim because they show that
the main clause and the appositive can both be accessible so long as the appositive is
attached via a subordinating relation. It is precisely due to attachment data like these
that discourse theories tend to treat Last as a special unit while also laying out rules
for when a discourse unit can attach to a unit other than Last.
Still, we agree with Koev (2012) and Amaral et al. (2007) that examples with
medial appositives interact differently with corrections than their variants without
appositives. Consider (19), a variant of an example from Amaral et al. 2007.
(19) a. Edna is always very brave, so they let her start the descent.
b. They let Edna, who is always very brave, start the descent.
c. No, that’s not true/she isn’t. She is a coward.
A highly context dependent correction like No, that’s not true must target an element 
on the RF. The fact that (c) can target the first sentence of (a) shows that in dialogue, 
an interlocutor i can ignore the speaker’s last utterance, even if it pushes the RF of 
the speaker’s representation forward, if i hasn’t been given a chance to correct the 
preceding utterance; an interlocutor commits to the content of a discourse graph 
only by explicitly building on it or by passing up a chance to correct it. Ignoring the 
content following the appositive in (b), however, would lead to an anomalous result: 
i would commit to an EDU with the fragmentary content, they let Edna.
SDRT does allow, however, for discourse subordination (Asher 1993), in which
elements off the RF can be made available by the use of complex descriptions or
the repetition of relevant content. We saw an illustration of this in (5c), but we
also observe that She is a coward alone would be an acceptable correction of (19b).
Prosody also has important effects on discourse structure (Reese 2007). A final
falling intonation contour on the medial appositive might affect its position in the
overall discourse structure, making it accessible according to our definition of the
RF, as might a particular contour on the continuation.13 We leave the effects of
prosody on the status of (N)AI content for future research.
The idea of (N)AI content that emerges from our view undermines the binary
distinction proposed in other accounts in favour of a more diffuse account in which
content is at-issue at a certain point of the discourse just in case it is on the RF of the
discourse at that time. Content that is AI becomes NAI when knocked off the RF;
content that is NAI can become AI if targeted through discourse subordination, as
happens to Wesley’s presupposition in (5b/c). The resulting model takes into account
semantic and syntactic features of the sentences, as those can play an integral role in
determining how discourse is structured, but being at-issue is ultimately a discourse
level notion. And while our SDRT discourse semantics exploits public commitments
to analyze the contents of conversations so that each speaker commits to what she has
asserted (Asher & Venant 2015), a speaker cannot force her interlocutor to commit to
a proposition p just by using a grammatical device. Acceptance, let alone a mutual
commitment to content, requires explicit moves by the interlocutor, in line with the
ideas in Clark 1992.
4 The AI/NAI distinction and conversational goals
While we have argued that how an expression contributes content in the overall
discourse structure captures data marshalled in favor of the AI/NAI distinction, we
have not denied the observation that motivated syntactic/semantic accounts in the
first place—namely, that NAI constructions make wonderful tools for forcing their
content into a discourse-secondary role. In this section, we explore the question of
why we should have such tools in the first place. It is evident that they are useful for
adding background information about an entity under discussion or new material
that a speaker finds helpful but less important. Equally important, however, is that
they can be used to sneak in controversial information that is central to a speaker’s
conversational goals. In the remainder of this paper, we argue that a more general
account of discourse structure not only yields a superior model of (N)AI content, but
also a broader understanding of the usefulness of NAI devices.
13 As suggested by Paul Portner, p.c.
Consider again the exchange in (5) from the film The Princess B ride. (5) is 
an example of a non-cooperative conversation in the sense of Asher & Lascarides 
2013, so speaker intentions need not be mirrored by the discourse structure, and 
the discourse connections that interpreters infer need not adhere to a speaker’s 
intentions as is evident in political debates and other examples (cf. Lepore & Stone 
2015).14 In fact, in a strategic conversation in which interlocutors have different 
discourse goals, NAI content can be more indicative of a speaker’s discourse goals 
(or the issue/question that the speaker aims to discuss) than AI content, contrary to 
the assumption made in Roberts 2012 inter alia that there is a direct relationship 
between discourse goals and AI content.
This complicated relationship between (N)AI content and discourse goals makes 
NAI content a strategically useful device for shifting the issue/question under dis-
cussion and, consequently, what counts as AI and NAI content, as we explain below. 
Importantly, these shifts can go beyond short challenges of NAI content or NAI-
centered interludes aimed at clarifying or justifying NAI content discussed in the 
QUD literature, (e.g., Potts 2012; Roberts 2012; Ginzburg 2012).
Following Asher et al. (2016), we model a conversational goal as a subset of all 
possible conversations in the sequential game space of all possible discourse moves. 
The goal of making a conversation coherent, for example, is modelled as the set 
of all coherent strings of discourse moves. Not angering one’s interlocutor might 
be another goal, denoting a different set of strings. Exogenously given decision 
problems or conversations aimed at answering a particular question are also instances 
of such goals. Goals can be complex, formed from combinations of simpler goals. 
We’ll assume that each participant or player i in a conversational game has a goal 
or winning set Wini, and that a strategy for a player i is a function from a prefix of 
a conversation to a sequence of moves by i. Players adopt strategies to steer the 
conversation into Wini.
Let’s now return to (5) and assign Wesley the following conversational goal: to 
get clear on Buttercup’s feelings for Humperdink. This goal, as is clear in the larger 
discourse from which (5) is taken, is a part of a strategy to achieve a larger discourse 
goal: to determine whether Buttercup still loves Wesley (and Wesley alone). An 
answer from Buttercup regarding her feelings for Humperdink takes Wesley one step 
closer to his larger goal. Notice however, that neither the larger goal nor the sub-goal 
is straightforwardly reflected in the AI/NAI content distinction: Buttercup’s attitude 
to the presuppositional content in (5c) is ultimately what interests Wesley.
Given that the presuppositional content is actually what is relevant to Wesley’s 
conversational goal, why does he opt for an NAI device—that is, a device that 
makes this content less accessible? Why not ask Buttercup directly if she loves
14 We note that this view also follows from SDRT’s semantics in terms of public commitments.
Humperdink? By opting for an NAI device, Wesley conceals his discourse goal,
leaving Buttercup less likely to consider this goal when planning her own discourse
moves. This sets up the situation for a potentially more honest answer, while a direct
question might, for example, lead her to be suspicious about the purpose of the
question and might make her more likely to dissimulate her true feelings. Using an
NAI device has an additional benefit: precisely because it requires more effort to
correct a presupposition, a correction of it is all the more meaningful.
Let’s see more precisely how the use of the NAI device is useful to Wesley in
achieving his winning condition. If Buttercup corrects the NAI content as she does
in (5c), then Wesley can assume that she does not love Humperdink and can then
pursue his larger goal of determining whether she still loves him. A further benefit of
using an NAI device in this case is that when Buttercup corrects the presuppositional
content, she becomes responsible for making it AI. This allows Wesley to pursue his
personal conversational goals while continuing to conceal them, at least for a while.
But suppose Buttercup had not questioned the NAI content and had responded
only to the AI content with, Yes, he will save me. How would such a response have
served Wesley? First of all, her acceptance and public commitment15 to the NAI
content would allow Wesley to cut his losses and infer that her romantic allegiances
had shifted to Humperdink. Another consequence is that the discussion of Butter-
cup’s love for Humperdink would remain NAI in this case. This is advantageous
because there is no reason for Wesley to pursue the question if Buttercup does love
Humperdink, and because it allows him to avoid a potentially painful topic (Butter-
cup’s feelings for Humperdink) or at least awkward questions from Buttercup such
as Who are you and why do you want to know?, which would have been triggered by
the use of an AI device to achieve Wesley’s conversational goal.
To give another example of the usefulness of NAI moves in conversational
strategies, consider (20), taken from a voire-dire examination, where the plaintiff
lawyer LP is trying to extract information from an expert witness D about a surgery
performed by the defendant Dr. Tzeng. After hours of testimony and questioning of
D by LP in which they have already discussed at length the operation the defendant
had performed, the plaintiff’s lawyer uses several NAI devices to slip a claim that
the defendant was guilty of negligence if not malpractice. LP’s conversational goals
in (20) are arguably quite complex. He probably suspects that even if he extracts a
commitment from D that the defendant was negligent during the surgical operation,
D will be prompted by the defendant’s lawyer to reconsider. But his larger goal is
to show that D is not impartial as an expert witness, whose testimony is crafted in
15 A speaker’s use of a presupposition should not entail that her addressee commits to its content, but
once an addressee responds positively to a structured proposal by building on that structure, she 
commits herself to the whole of both its content and its structure. A rejection move, by contrast, 
might target only part of the structured proposal. See the discussion of correction in Section 3.3.
conjunction with the help of the defendant’s lawyer to help the defendant.
(20) a. LP: And we know in addition to that, that Dr. Tzeng tore apart this
medial antebrachial cutaneous nerve?
b. D: Correct.
c. LD: Objection
d. The Court: Overruled.
e. D: There was a division of that nerve. I’m not sure I would say “tore
apart” would be the word that I would use.
f. LP: Oh, there you go. You’re getting a hint from your lawyer over here,
so do you want to retract what you’re saying?
Once again, we can ask about the usefulness of the NAI device as opposed to an 
AI device in bringing about LP’s winning condition. Using an AI device like Did the 
defendant not exhibit negligence in tearing apart this medial antebrachial cutaneous 
nerve? would most likely have simply resulted in a simple denial. But by repeatedly 
coming back to the nature of the operation, LP has primed D to think he’s “heard 
it all before”, and set D up to be inattentive to exact wording. Using several NAI 
triggers to introduce the damning content would have required D to be attentive and 
to construct a complicated response in which he denied a commitment to the NAI 
content. But D was apparently inattentive, and issued a short agreement response, 
which committed D to the defendant’s intentional action of tearing apart the nerve 
and hence to negligence if not malpractice. LP has used the NAI construction to 
good effect, and we see here that acceptance of NAI content can be incriminating. 
The ensuing interactions in (20a-c) are a perfect setup for LP to make the move in 
(20f) and make the jury suspect that D was covering something up. Thus, once again 
we see the interest of an NAI device in strategic conversation.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a discourse based account of the behavior of appositives and 
in principle other expressions that are ordinarily thought to convey NAI content. 
We’ve shown that whether the content conveyed by such constructions is NAI or not 
depends upon the discourse structure in which these contents are embedded. Further, 
we’ve shown that the distinction between NAI and AI content is not a simple binary 
one but more nuanced and that a discourse based account predicts a much wider 
range of phenomena than competing accounts based on multidimensional semantics 
or multiple update mechanisms. Finally, we have shown how a strategic conception 
of dialogue can shed light on the uses of these constructions in discourse structure.
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